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Who's Afraid of the Hated Political Gerrymander?
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer'
The political gerrymander has few friends among scholars and commentators.
Even a majority on the Supreme Court agreed that the practice violates
constitutional and democratic norms. Andyet, this is one of the few issues that the
US. Supreme Court refuses to regulate. The justices mask their refusal to regulate
this area on a professed inability to divine juaicially-manageable standards. In turn,
scholars offer new standards for the justices to consider. This is not only a mistake
but also misguided. The history of the political question doctrine makes clear thatthe discovery of manageable standards has never controlled the Court's prior
decisions to venture into the field ofpolitics. Further, existing doctrine makes clear
that the question of whether politics play an excessive role in redistricting could be
easily handled by the Court.
Thus the question at the heart of this Article: how to explain thejudicial refusal
to decide political gerrymandeting questions in a world where the Court intervenes
just about everywhere else? This Article concludes that the Court, and particularly
Justice Kennedy, is worried about an assumed flood oflitigation that would follow
judicial intervention in this area. But this is not a new worry. This is the very
concern that drove critics of the reapportionment revolution, a time when the
Court happily created a standard out of thin air and declared unconstitutional all
state legislatures at once. Rather than standards, Justice Kennedy needs a dose of
history.
INTRODUCTION
Few issues in American politics elicit the reactions borne by the mere mention
of the political gerrymander. This is where modem critics of the political process
and our present partisan polarization focus on the rigging of redistricting lines by
self-interested party operatives hell-bent on securing political victories into the
foreseeable future. To be sure, the empirics are fuzzy-that is, whether the hated
gerrymander is guilty of all the things ascribed to it.2 But it is also true that few
commentators defend the practice as a positive political good.' This might be the
one place in our politics where consensus is reached.
Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow at Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 312 (2011) (arguing that "the evidence that
gerrymandering is a major cause of the decline in competitive elections is not powerful").
3 For such defenses, see generally THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION:
WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERiCA 2 (2008) (arguing that "districts should not
be drawn to maximize competitiveness, the approach commonly announced to be best, but instead
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Ironically, this is also one of the few issues that the U.S. Supreme Court refuses
to regulate. 4 This is remarkable. Generations ago, Alexander Bickel counseled for
the Court's use of the "passive virtues" as a way to protect its legitimacy from too
much involvement in questions best left alone.5 But that is not the world we live in.
Rather, we live in a world where the Court stands willing and ready to intervene in
most aspects of our lives, from campaign finance6 to health care7 and the right to
marry.8 Judicial supremacy is the order of our day.9 And yet, the Court is unwilling
to intervene in the one sphere where consensus abounds and public opinion is
dearly and unequivocally on its side. Without question, this is one of the great legal
puzzles of our generation. How to explain it?
The Court's stated reason for its refusal to regulate this question is a professed
lack of judicially manageable standards.1 ° This inability to find such a standard
renders this issue a political question, which the Court happily delegates to the
political branches alone." Curiously, the political question doctrine is one of the
"passive virtues" catalogued by Bickel. 2 But the Court's answer is a red-herring, the
history of the political question doctrine, as Part I argues, makes clear that the
discovery of judicially manageable standards has never controlled the Court's prior
decisions to venture into the field of politics. The doctrine has long been
domesticated."3 This is especially true in the gerrymandering context, a sub-species
of the redistricting question at the heart of the reapportionment revolution and the
logical resting place for the equality and fairness concerns that gave rise to judicial
intervention in this area.
Thus, as Part II explains, it is not enough to simply point to a lack of standards,
nor will an answer to this puzzle be unlocked by providing new standards for the
Court to consider. The case law already provides a standard for the Court to
regulate the hated political gerrymander, and Part III discusses it in detail. What is
required, as the reapportionment revolution shows, is the requisite judicial will.
should be drawn in such a way that they are 'packed' with as many like-minded partisans in each district
as possible"); Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against
Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 431, 432 (2005) (arguing that
competition is not necessarily a goal that should be pursued in the redistricting process").
4 See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550-52 (1946) (refusing to force Illinois to redistrict after
the 1940 census, stating that it was "beyond its competence to grant.").
s See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1961).
6 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,319 (2010).
7 See Nat'l Fed. of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
s See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
9 See Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End offudicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 621,
622 (2012).
10 See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
' See Bickel, supra note 5, at 42.
13 Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2002).
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This is an argument in four parts. Part I tells a brief history of the fall of
political questions. The case at the center of this story is Baker v. Carr.4 This story
is important for what it teaches us about judicial intervention and the role played by
manageable standards." This Part argues that it is all-or-nothing: once the Court
entered the field of politics, it could not draw a principled distinction between
redistricting cases writ-large and gerrymandering cases. Part II examines the
gerrymandering cases with some care, both racial and political. This Part questions
why the Court decides racial gerrymandering questions with such ease yet avoids
political gerrymandering and argues that the Court's reasons fall short.
Part III situates the political gerrymandering cases where they belong: alongside
the racial gerrymandering cases and within Baker and its progeny. Baker sets a very
flexible and forgiving barrier: the state must behave reasonably. 6 As applied to the
gerrymandering question, this means that while the use of politics is a legitimate
state interest, the state may not use it excessively. In the language of doctrine,
political considerations-i.e., partisanship-may not predominate. This is a
standard that the Court enforced, with great success, in both the minority vote
dilution cases and the more recent Shaw cases." And to the criticism that this
standard would embroil the Courts in these questions, the obvious answer is that
these were the very grounds upon which Baker was fought."8 Justice Frankfurter
lost this battle long ago.
By way of a conclusion, Part IV explores some of the lessons of the Court's
refusal to examine political gerrymandering questions. Two lessons stand out. The
first lesson underscores the importance of asking the right questions. To ask for a
judicially manageable standard for political gerrymandering questions
misapprehends the history of redistricting regulation and the Court's role in
domesticating this area of the law. But worse, to ask this question is to exacerbate
the problem, to legitimize an erroneous view of history and doctrine.
The second lesson questions the view of the Court as a cautious institution. In
other words, and to return to a question asked at the onset, how to explain the
judicial refusal to decide political gerrymandering questions in a world where the
Court intervenes just about everywhere else? This is the most interesting question
raised by the political gerrymandering impasse. What differentiates political
gerrymandering questions from most other questions that the Court routinely
decides? Part IV posits that the Court, and particularly Justice Kennedy, is worried
about an assumed flood of litigation that would follow judicial intervention in this
14 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
15 See id.
16 See id
17 See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
s Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) ("Even assuming the indispensable intellectual
disinterestedness on the part of judges in such matters, they do not have accepted legal standards or
criteria or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial judgments.") (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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area. But this is not a new worry. This is the very concern that drove critics of the
reapportionment revolution, a time when the Court happily created a standard out
of thin air and declared unconstitutional all state legislatures at once. This means
that a search for standards is ultimately futile; rather, what Justice Kennedy needs is
a dose of history.
I. THE FALL OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS: A BRIEF HISTORY
For many years, the Supreme Court refused to entertain redistricting questions.
In the notorious case of Giles v. Haris, for example, the Court examined the wave
of voter suppression laws throughout the South that began in Mississippi in 1890.'9
This was the same wave that provided for the mass disenfranchisement of the
African-American community that had joined the voting rolls post-
Reconstruction.2"
The disenfranchisement was staggering and quite blatant.2" In Louisiana, for
example, the number of black registered voters declined from 130,334 in 1897 to
5,320 in 1900 to 730 in 1910, or less than 0.5% of all eligible black men.' The
same was true throughout the South.' It strains credulity to suggest that these
measures, which included cumulative poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses,
good character clauses, and lengthy residency requirements, did not violate the U.S.
Constitution, specifically the Fifteenth Amendment.24
The Supreme Court wanted no part of this fight. In the words of Justice
Holmes:
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the
blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more than ordering the
plaintiffs name to be inscribed upon the lists of 1902 will be needed. If the
conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat them.
Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that state by officers of the
court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an
empty form. Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political
wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the state itself, must be
given by them or by the legislative and political department of the government of
the United States.Y
This is an arresting passage to modem ears, so accustomed to a very muscular
and aggressive Court. But this was not a fight the justices thought they could win.
"9 See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,483 (1903).
2 See id
2 1 See id
22United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D. La. 1963).
21 See id. at 363.
24 See id
5 Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
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This became a familiar refrain. In the 1946 case of Colegrove v. Green, the
Court similarly refused to force the state of Illinois to redistrict after the 1940
census.26 The malapportionment was severe; the biggest district had 914,000
people, while the smallest had 112,116.27 The Court argued that this was a non-
justiciable political question.2' This was not a question about discriminatory
exclusion from rights enjoyed by others; instead, it was "an appeal to the federal
courts to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may be
adequately represented in the councils of the Nation."29 This was the case that gave
us the famous line, "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket."3 ' And like
Justice Holmes before him, Justice Frankfurter pointed reformers to the political
process for a remedy: 'The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State
legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of
Congress."31
Notably, Justice Black's dissent in Colegrove foreshadowed the
reapportionment revolution of the next generation. 32 His argument was disarmingly
simple: if the state could not pick out voters and deny them the right to vote, nor
could it give some citizens more votes than others, it stood to reason that the state
could not weigh votes differently.33 All votes must be weighed equally.34 For
constitutional support, he looked to Article I, Section 2. He argued that "state
legislatures must make real efforts to bring about approximately equal
representation of citizens in Congress. "35
Then everything changed in 1962. The case was Baker v. CaXr. 36 To be sure,
the Court had ventured into the field and decided matters of politics before-the
White Primary cases come to mind,37 and Guinn v. United States,3" a grandfather
clause case decided in 1915, and Gomillon v. Lightfoot,39 the infamous Tuskegee
gerrymander-but these cases were about racial discrimination, a context in which,
for reasons left unexplained,' the Court felt freer to intervene. Moreover, the
26 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550-52 (1946).
27 Id. at 566 (Black, J., dissenting).
21 See id. at 556 (majority opinion).
9Id at 552.
30 Id. at 556.
31 Id.
32 See i. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 574.
34 See id. at 568.
31 Id. at 572.36 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (deciding that redistricting issues present justiciable questions).
37 SeeTerry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 478 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 650-51 (1944).
31 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915).
39 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
1 See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 ("This is not a case in which a State has, through a device however
oblique and sophisticated, denied Negroes or Jews or redheaded persons a vote, or given them only a
third or a sixth of a vote."). A cynic would include Giles as a case about racial discrimination as well.
And that is the point of the Article.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Court's intervention in those cases was surgical, which allowed the Court to
maintain its facade that it was not making political decisions but upholding the
Constitution's command to racial equality.
Baker changed that. The facts in Baker were familiar: a severe
malapportionment borne of a refusal from state legislatures to redistrict in the face
of mass migrations.4 1 Tennessee had last redistricted decades before, so that by the
1960 census, the number of people within each district could not be explained in
any rational way.4 2 The plan, and the number of voters within each district, just
happened. Scholars have described this situation as a "silent gerrymander,"43 or
what Alexander Bickel called an "orgy of inactivity,"" for good reason. Lines were
not redrawn because incumbent politicians had no incentive to redraw them.
The first question facing the Court in Baker was the justiciability issue: were
political questions, as then understood, non-justiciable? This question led the
Court to state the factors it found "on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question."45 The Court enumerated six factors:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind dearly for nonjudicial discretion; [4] or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [6]
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.46
The Court disposed of most factors summarily.47 The biggest hurdle was the
second factor: whether judicially manageable standards exist to govern these cases. 48
It bears reminding that this factor poses the big hurdle in the political
gerrymandering arena. At the time of Baker, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
criticized the majority on the ground that the Constitution did not provide
discoverable and judicially manageable standards for deciding these questions.4 9
This was the Court's answer:
Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter
upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
41 Id. at 253-57.
42 Id. at 258.
43 Leroy C. Hardy, Considering the Gerrymander, 4 PEPP. L. REv. 243,249-52 (1977).
44 Alexander M. Bickel, The Dutw biliofColegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 44 (1962).
41 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
46Id.
I Id. at 217-25.
41 Id. at 223-26.
49 See id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting).'
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familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.50
The Court was pointing to rationality as the proper judicial standard."1 The
issue in Baker-and this is made clear by the oral argument and the positions taken
by Justices Clark and Stewart-was the fact that the districts could not be
explained in any rational way. The overall plan was a "crazy quilt," lacking
rationality. Bakerwas an easy case.
What would the Court do with the next case, once state legislatures were
prodded into action? The Court gave us an answer two years later in Reynolds v.
Sims. 2 This was the "one person, one vote" standard.5 3 The argument was simple.
First, the Court explained that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative
bodies." 4 In the American system, this is largely achieved by choosing
representatives. To the Court, this meant that "[f]ull and effective participation by
all citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen have an equally
effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.""5
This was a brazen opinion. As Justice Harlan argued in dissent, "people are not
ciphers and . . .legislators can represent their electors only by speaking for their
interests-conomic, social, political-many of which do reflect the place where
the electors live." 6 No matter. Reynolds v. Sims led to the constitutionalization of
majority rule, which the Court happily defended. But the arguments offered by the
Court were woefully unconvincing. Consider here the traditional worry that the
Court would be declaring unconstitutional almost all state legislatures across the
nation. The Court did not worry in 1964 as it did years before, because "a denial of
constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our
office require no less of us." 7 A flurry of clich6s and unsupported statements
followed. For example: "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is
that much less a citizen." 8 Also: "Population is, of necessity, the starting point for
consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative
apportionment controversies." 9 And here was the Court's glib answer to the
o Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
51 CZ Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting
Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2002) (arguing that "lower courts were given
the proper room after Baker to decide redistricting questions in accordance with their particular views
about rationality and arbitrariness").
52 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53 Id. at 558.
541 d at 565.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 623-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17 1d. at 566 (majority opinion).
5s Id. at 567.
59 Id.
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argument that states could choose to follow the example of the US Senate, which
was grossly malapportioned in reference to population figures: "[T]he federal
analogy was inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes."6 ° The
Court did not explain this conclusion in any convincing way.
Making sense of Reynolds helps us understand where we are today. The
plaintiffs in the case argued that their right to vote had been unconstitutionally
diluted because they were unable to exercise, through their elected representatives,
a fair share of the state's legislative power. The Court accorded them expansive
constitutional protection, and a constitutional standard was born--one person, one
vote. Reynolds was a case about the weighing of votes across districts and how
much vote dilution the Constitution would tolerate.
Notably, the Court was aware in Reynolds that other considerations played a
role during the redistricting process, including compactness, contiguity, and a
"desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions." 6' The Court
noted that to disregard these and all other considerations to the ultimate goal of
population equality "may be little more than an open invitation to partisan
gerrymandering."62 And yet, the Court concluded that "substantial equality of
population" must be the overriding goal of all redistricting plans.6 3
The malapportionment cases are direct progenitors of the political
gerrymandering cases. The question in the malapportionment cases was, how much
vote dilution does the Constitution allow? According to the Reynolds Court, not
very much. But this conclusion only got the justices half-way to their desired
destination. They must still face the question of a judicially manageable standards.
This was not a hard thing to do. As Justice Harlan argued in his dissent in
Reynolds, the Court created a new standard out of thin air:
Stripped of aphorisms, the Court's argument boils down to the assertion that
appellees' right to vote has been invidiously "debased" or "diluted" by systems of
apportionment which entitle them to vote for fewer legislators than other voters,
an assertion which is tied to the Equal Protection Clause only by the
constitutionally frail tautology that "equal" means "equal.' 4
The Court discovered a judicially manageable standard only because it wished
to discover one;65 nothing from the Constitution helped the Court get there.
The following decade, the Court sought to regulate the redistricting area
through the equipopulation principle.66 The overarching issue was to secure fair and
60 ld. at 573.61 d. at 578.
12 Id. at 579.
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 590 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65 For a discussion on this point, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer. Reynolds
Revisited, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 21, 49-52 (Joshua A. Douglas and Eugene D. Mazo eds.,
2016).
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effective representation. The Court tried to accomplish that laudable goal through
population equality, but that proved to be a difficult quest. The year after Reynolds,
the Court faced the next logical question and the obvious implication of the one
person, one vote revolution: the extent to which multimember districts might"operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements
of the voting population." 7 Taken to its logical conclusion, Reynolds appeared to
demand single-member districts across the board. But the Court was unwilling to
take this step.6" In the meantime, redistricters grew savvy and accomplished their
racial and political goals all the same. Nothing changed as the Court might have
wished and expected.
Throughout the 1970s, the Court wrestled with the gerrymandering question,
but not overtly.69 In 1971, Justice Douglas called attention to the issue by observing
that the gerrymandering question was "the other half of Reynolds v. Sims." 7 The
cases were mirror images of one another. Baker offers a dearer comparison; the
case examined questions of representation and political losses while setting a very
high bar for litigants to meet. Through either Baker or Reynolds we get directly to
the gerrymandering cases, which the next Part discusses in more detail.
II. WHAT IS SO DIFFERENT ABOUT GERRYMANDERING QUESTIONS?
The gerrymandering question has loomed large in the history of voting
regulations. To date, the Court has been unwilling to examine gerrymandering
questions in the same way that it has treated redistricting questions generally. This
is puzzling in many ways, not the least of which is the fact that they raise essentially
the same question: how much dilution, racial and/or political, does the
Constitution permit?
A. Racial Geriymandering, from Gomillion to Shaw.
In 1957, the Alabama legislature enacted Local Act No. 140, which redrew the
boundaries of the city of Tuskegee.7' Black citizens of Tuskegee brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of the Act.72 These plaintiffs had been residents of
the city before the redistricting but were fenced out after the new lines were
drawn.73 The new map, according to the Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, "alters
' See, e.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 544 (1969); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439
(1965).
67 Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439.
6 See id.
69 See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
7o Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 176 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part).
71 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960)72Id.
73 Id. at 341.
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the shape of Tuskegee from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure."74 If
the allegations were proven at trial, the Court explained that they would amount to
a deprivation of the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment.75 To Justice
Frankfurter, that would set this case apart from the political question world of
Colegrove and place it within a constitutional realm that the Court was willing and
able to adjudicate.
To be sure, the Alabama legislature made it too easy on the Court. The facts
were extreme. But less than forty years after Gomillion, the Court showed that
facts need not always offer easy answers in order for the justices to choose to
intervene in these disputes. The case was Shaw v. Reno.76 Shawarose after the 1990
redistricting, when the state of North Carolina attempted to fufill its political
responsibilities while complying with the state and federal constitutions, as well as
federal law."7
Here is the case in a nutshell: Democrats in the state drafted as friendly a
congressional redistricting plan as they could, which they then submitted to the
Attorney General for preclearance as demanded by Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.78 This plan had only one majority black district.79 Since the state had no black
elected officials in its congressional delegation, the plan did not violate Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act and thus should have been cleared by the Attorney
General."0 But the Attorney General refused to preclear the plan because the state
could have easily created a second majority black district.81 To do so, however,
would have had obvious political costs for the Democrats. 2 So they created a
second black district in order to comply with the federal request, but did so
creatively.' Requirements for compactness and the preservation of communities of
interest were not always observed.' Since these were neither constitutional nor
federal requirements, the Attorney General approved the new plan.85
The U. S. Supreme Court did not agree.8 6 A mere look at the map raised the
collective eyebrows of the conservative justices. One of the Districts-Twelve-
was hardly contiguous, compact in name only, and did not preserve communities of
interest very well. 7 The problem for the Court was that the plan violated no law,
74Id. at 340.
75 Id. at 346.
76 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
77 See id. at 633.
78 Id. at 633-36
79 Id. at 633.
10 Id. at 635-36.
81 Id.
8 See id.
3 See id. at 636.
94 See id.
" See id.
Id. at 649.
17 See id. at 635-36.
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state or federal, nor did it violate standing constitutional doctrine as then in
existence... No matter. According to the Court,
a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection
Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on
its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation
lacks sufficient justification.'
This was the genesis of the "expressive harms" doctrine. 90 Two years later, in
Miller v. Johnson, the Court transformed this doctrine into a "predominant factor"
inquiry.91 This was a new doctrinal development.'
The Court in Shawwished to align the case with longstanding doctrine, but the
Court knew better. In a key passage, the Court conceded that the case recognized a
new and "analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot
be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate
voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification."93 This was not
the law as it then stood. Furthermore, the case also fails miserably on its reading of
the facts. Can a reasonable person look at the map in question and only conclude
that this was an effort to separate voters on the basis of race? And what exactly is
wrong with the justifications for the choices made by political actors in North
Carolina? What makes these choices "insufficient?"
In hindsight, it is dear that the Shaw doctrine was an overreaction to the
creative ways in which political actors went about their business. Political actors
used race as part of their redistricting duties; of course they did. But it strains
credulity to argue, as the conservative justices did, that the use of race
predominated in the process. More important for purposes of this Article, and
what I take to be the real lesson of Shaw, is how easily the Court moved past the
"judicially manageable standard" requirement.9 4 What looked like a classic political
question ceased to be one as soon as the conservative justices decided otherwise.
Notably, yet unsurprisingly, the apparent lack of a judicially manageable standard
did not pose any kind of barrier for justices willing to get to the heart of the case.
11 Id. at 650.
'9 Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
90 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07
(1993).
91 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 901 (1995).
92 See Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action after the
Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1569, 1583 (2002) ("That had not previously been the
law.").
93509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993).
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647-49.
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B. Political Gerrymandering: The Final Step.
The political gerrymandering doctrine did not evolve the way that the racial
gerrymandering doctrine did. It is hard to make sense of this divergence. Once the
Court crossed the political question threshold in Baker, there is very little
principled distinction between what it did in Reynolds and what it refuses to do in
the political gerrymandering area. This is because, as Robert Dixon noted long ago,
all redistricting is essentially gerrymandering.95 The Court recognized this point in
Gaffney v. Cummings, when it wrote that "Lt]he very essence of districting is to
produce a different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be reached with
elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the legislative
seats. Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and
apportionment. "More damningly, the Court continued:
District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They can well determine what district
will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a dose
race likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents against one another or make very
difficult the election of the most experienced legislator. The reality is that
districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequencesY7
How then to distinguish between the BakelReynolds line of cases, and their
logical extension, to the regulation of political gerrymandering questions? Not
easily.
In the year after Reynolds, the justices recognized as much. In Fortson v.
Dorsey, the Court wrote that "[i]t might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a
multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial or political elements of the voting population." 5 But this was not the time,
nor the case, to so decide. The Court was likely worried about what its role in the
political process might be. The Court made this worry explicit in Gaflney:
That the Court was not deterred by the hazards of the political thicket when it
undertook to adjudicate the reapportionment cases does not mean that it should
become bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment slough, particularly
when there is little, if anything, to be accomplished by doing so.9
95See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT 1N LAW AND
POLITICS 462 (1968).
"Gaffhey v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
97Id.
9' Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
99 Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 749-50.
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This concern led the justices to sanction the Connecticut bipartisan
gerrymander in Gaffney."°° For guidance, the Court noted that so long as racial or
political groups are not "fenced out" or their voting strength "invidiously
minimized" (whatever that means), it would not act.'
And then came Davis v. Bandemer, which finally made explicit what the
doctrine up to that point had implied."°2 Writing for a plurality of the Court,
Justice White situated political gerrymandering questions as a subspecies of the
BakedrReynolds line of cases, properly understood as a question of
representation. 0 3 This was something the Court had adjudicated many times
before, and the Court explicitly "decline[d] to hold that [representation] claims are
never justiciable."1°4 But the question remained: would the Court locate a judicially
manageable standard?
Bandemer understandably looked to general constitutional principles. This
meant that challengers to redistricting plans must "prove both intentional
discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory
effect on that group."0' The intent requirement would not be hard to prove: so
long as the redistricting was conducted by a legislature, "it should not be very
difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were
intended."" 6
The discriminatory effect requirement has proven far more elusive to establish.
The Bandemer Court offered the following: "unconstitutional discrimination
occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole." 7 The discrimination could be established at either the district or state
level.' Both inquiries ask the same question: "whether a particular group has been
unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process,"'0 9
or whether "the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their
opportunity to influence the political process effectively.""0 The inquiries, however,
diverge on their evidentiary demands."'
o Id. at 754 ("Even more plainly, judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports
fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite
tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so.").1 Seeid.
102 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
103 See id. at 123-24.
101 Id. at 124.
105 Id at 127.
106 Id. at 129.
107 Id. at 132.
101 See id. at 133.
101 Id. at 132-33.
110 d. at 133.
111 See id.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
At the district level, a challenger must focus "on the opportunity of members of
the group to participate in party deliberations in the slating and nomination of
candidates, their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to
directly influence the election returns and to secure the attention of the winning
candidate."112 Statewide, evidence must focus on "the voters' direct or indirect
influence on the elections of the state legislature as a whole."'13 In either situation,
the evidence must be about "continued frustration of the will of a majority of the
voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the
political process."" 4
As you read the above two paragraphs, it is easy to appreciate why Bandemer
had so little bite. The language is so broad that it borders on useless. What is"effective influence," for example, or "substantial disadvantage?" Further, with
Baken'Reynolds in place, which essentially force states to redistrict after every
census, a "continued frustration of majority will"' standard is almost impossible to
meet. In the Court's defense, the question of fair representation is a very hard
question. Once Baker focused on vote dilution at the individual level, so that
Reynolds and strict population equality could easily follow, how does the Court
allow politics to play a role yet strike down redistricting plans that use politics
excessively? This is not an impossible inquiry, however; this is Miller v. Johnson,
which asks the justices to discern when redistricting plans use race excessively. 6 If
the Court can do the latter, there is no reason it cannot do the former.
Eighteen years later, the Court revisited Bandemer. The case was Vieth v.
Jubelirer,"7 which examined the Pennsylvania redistricting plan after the 2000
census. 8 The Court in Vieth could not coalesce and issue a majority opinion." 9
Four justices concluded that no judicially manageable standards could be
discerned,12' and four other justices provided myriad standards.'21 And in the
middle of this dispute was Justice Kennedy, unable to find a standard to decide this
case but unwilling to abdicate the field quite yet: "[t]hat no such standard has
emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the
future." 22 He explained:
Our willingness to enter the political thicket of the apportionment process with
respect to one-person, one-vote claims makes it particularly difficult to justify a
1 12 Id.
113 I.
1 14 Id.
115 Id.
116 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 906 (1995).
117 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
118 Id. at 272-73.
119 See id. at 270.
m Id. at 304.
21 Id. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 356 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
'id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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categorical refusal to entertain daims against this other type of gerrymandering.
The plurality's condusion that absent an "easily administrable standard," the
appellants' daim must be nonjusticiable contrasts starkly with the more patient
approach of Baker v. Carr, not to mention the controlling precedent on the
question of justiciability of Davis v. Bandemer, the case the plurality would
overle.m
Whatever one thinks of Justice Kennedy in general, it is hard to disagree with
him here. This was my argument before: this is Baken/Reynolds redux, so how to
justify complete judicial abdication?
It is easy, even fun, to get bogged down in the many underlying debates going
on in the case. But this is ultimately a futile exercise. On the one hand, Scalia and
the three justices who join his plurality are hopeless: nothing satisfies them. The
predominant intent test, for example, will not work in the political gerrymandering
area even if it is the same test used in the racial gerrymandering cases because
applying it to a racial gerrymandering "is easier and less disruptive."124 But that
cannot possibly be true. This is nothing but an "ipse dixit distinction. 2 The
plaintiffs also proposed an effects test modeled after Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, but that will not work since, even if judicially manageable, it is not "judicially
discernible in the sense of being relevant to some constitutional violation."1 26 And
so it goes.
On the other hand, the dissenting four will take any standard that satisfies
Justice Kennedy. For example, Justice Breyer proposes an "unjustified
entrenchment" test;, 127 Justice Souter posits a burden-shifting framework akin to
McDonnell Douglas,"'2  and Justice Stevens looks to the analogous racial
gerrymandering cases, which ask whether one criterion predominates during the
redistricting process in a way offensive to the Constitution. 29 But the very fact that
the dissenters could not agree on a single standard leads Justice Scalia to conclude
I Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
124 Id. at 285 (plurality opinion).
125 Id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 6 d. at 288 (plurality opinion).
127 Id. at 360-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Ortiz v. Hershey, 580 Fed. App'x. 352 (6th Cir. 2014)
(discussing a burden-shifting analysis in finding discrimination under Title VII in the employment
context).
129 The same dynamic takes place in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULA C), 548
U.S. 399 (2006). Justice Stevens writes that the partisan symmetry standard "is widely accepted by
scholars as providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral systems." Id. at 466 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter similarly states that "[i]nterest in exploring this
notion is evident. Perhaps further attention could be devoted to the administrability of such a criterion
at all levels of redistricting and its review." Id. at 483-84 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citations omitted). But Justice Kennedy needs more: "Without altogether discounting its utility in
redistricting planning and litigation, I would conclude asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of
unconstitutional partisanship." Id. at 420 (majority opinion).
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that no one standard exists.'30 His arguments against each one, however, are not
terribly persuasive.
III. POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING QUESTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
In Vieth, Justice Kennedy proved unwilling to adopt a standard from the
myriad options available to him. Early in his concurring opinion, however, he offers
his general view on the question:
A determination that a gerrymander violates the law must rest on something
more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied. It must rest
instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally permissible, were
applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative
objective. 31
This is a burden that the plaintiffs in Vieth failed to meet. More specifically,
the plaintiffs alleged a burden by a political classification on their representational
rights. But they failed to show that this classification was unrelated to the aims of
redistricting. In the end, the best they could show was that the legislature used
politics during redistricting. This is not a constitutional violation.
Justice Kennedy is clearly on the right track. He agrees that the use of race in
redistricting is a legitimate state interest, yet he also agrees that the excessive use of
race violates the plaintiffs' representational rights."' What he needs--and what he
is asking litigants to provide-is a dividing line between the legitimate use of
politics and cases when the use of politics predominates the redistricting process.
He needs a way to differentiate the mere use of politics from its invidious, excessive
use. This is clearly a tall order.
It is also true, however, that the Court has done this before. This is Baker v.
Carr. In Baker, the Court saw the population numbers in question and demanded a
reason from the state in support of the existing plan.'33 The state did not have a
legitimate reason other than inaction, but that answer only satisfied Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan. The majority of the Court demanded more.
This is also what the Court does, even more directly, in ShaW34 and its
progeny. Shaw is important because its connection to the political gerrymandering
cases is unmistakable. The search for a constitutional standard is almost the same:
while race is a legitimate consideration for redistricters to use, racial factors cannot
130 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292 (plurality opinion) (observing that "the mere fact that these four dissenters
come up with three different standards---all of them different from the two proposed in Bandemer and
the one proposed here by the appellants--goes a long way to establish that there is no constitutionally
discernible standard").
131 Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132 See id.
133 See Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 235-37 (1962).
134 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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overwhelm the process. In Shaw, the Court took one look at the map and surmise
that racial factors had played an excessive role. In the next case, Miller v.
Johnson,'35 the Court used language that brought both inquiries closer together:
The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a
district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. To
make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated
traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations. Where these or other
race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not
subordinated to race, a State can "defeat a claim that a district has been
gerrymandered on racial lines." 13 6
Plaintiffs in racial gerrymandering cases must show that race predominated in
the redistricting process. This is precisely the inquiry in the political
gerrymandering context. If the Court can "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race," 137
there is nothing about the redistricting context that suggests the Court cannot
similarly "smoke out" the excessive use of politics.
The minority vote dilution cases provide further support. In Whitcomb v.
Chavis, the Court stated that a districting plan may "unconstitutionally operate to
dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements."138 The Court
subsequently explained the plaintiffs burden in White v. Regesteras follows:
[T]o produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.1 3 9
Whitcomb and Regester are notable for how unmanageable their demands
appear to be-so much so, in fact, that the Fifth Circuit attempted in Zimmer v.
McKeithen to set out a list of factors it gleaned from these cases. 14° But far more
important for purposes of this Article is how the Court understood that these cases
were part and parcel of the nascent reapportionment revolution. Unsurprisingly, the
Court hardly considered the question of manageable standards in these cases. This
was not a relevant question.
13 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
136 Id. at 916 (citing Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
137 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).131 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971).139 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
o Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973), af'd on other grounds sub nom. E.
Carroll Par. Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
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To be dear, the point of these cases is not that federal courts have already
established a standard to govern political gerrymandering claims or that the
standards in these cases provide the requisite guidance. Rather, the point is that
federal courts have managed large swaths of election law without the guidance of a
dear and manageable standard. The constitutional command against the excessive
use of race or politics has been enough.
The Vieth plurality disagreed.'41 Justice Scalia took up every argument raised by
both the plaintiffs and the dissenters and dismissed them summarily. 4 2 Justice
Scalia was at times philosopher, political scientist, and constitutional theorist. The
one thing he was not willing to be was a judge as we have come to understand the
term. He agreed that severe partisan gerrymanders were incompatible with
democratic principles, 4 a and he also agreed that "an excessive injection of politics is
unlawful."1" For him, the issue was not whether excessive use of partisan
identification violates the Constitution, "but whether it is for the courts to say
when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy."' 4
And that, in a nutshell, is the point. The Court claims that it does not regulate
political gerrymanders because it lacks manageable standards with which to do so.
But that is misleading. The Court does not regulate political gerrymanders because
it lacks the will to do so. Offering the justices more standards will not alter that
fact. The question in this context is not about judicial standards but why the Court
refuses to regulate the last frontier of our democracy while at the same time
choosing to intervene in most important questions of our day. The next Part
explores this great puzzle.
IV. THE PASSIVE VIRTUES IN AN ERA OFJUDICIAL SUPREMACY
All nine justices in Vieth agreed that the excessive use of partisanship in
redistricting raises grave constitutional concerns.' 6 Justice Kennedy, the Court's
resident super-median,'47 expresses his own concerns as follows: "The ordered
working of our Republic, and of the democratic process, depends on a sense of
decorum and restraint in all branches of government, and in the citizenry itself.
Here, one has the sense that legislative restraint was abandoned."14' A professed
lack of standards, however, refrains the Court from intervening. In the meantime,
141 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion).
142 See id. at 283-91.
143 See id. at 292.
144 Id. at 293.
145 Id. at 292.
" See id. at 292 (plurality opinion), 313-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 332-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
343 (Souter, J., dissenting), 361-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147 See Lee Epstein &TonjaJacobi, SuperMedians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37,39-40 (2008).
4 reth, 541 U.S. at 316.
[Vol. 104
2015-2016] Who's Afraid of the Hated Political Gerrymander? 575
the Court has curbed political excesses through indirect means, such as Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.' 49
Vieth makes for great reading, and its many opinions and rejoinders are the
stuff of challenging law school hypotheticals. The case fits oddly in our modern
constitutional world, where the Court decides any and all important questions of
policy. This is not to say that the modern Court is a restrained Court, by any
means. It is not. Think about this: how could a justice decide Bush v. Gore yet
feign powerlessness in the face of serious constitutional concerns?50 To focus on a
lack of manageable standards is not the answer. In fact, this focus obfuscates the
issue. But maybe that is the point.
In the wake of Vieth, scholars and commentators set out on a search for new
and improved (and judicially manageable) standards."' No standard that satisfies a
majority of the Court has yet to emerge. But this is a red herring. It is the clear
lesson of the reapportionment revolution that judicial intervention never hinged on
the discovery of standards. This area has long been domesticated. Once the Court
shifted its gaze to equality concerns in Baker, questions of democracy easily came
within the purview of constitutional law. Standards in this area, as the Baker Court
counseled, are "well developed and familiar."" 2 And a new field of study was born.
Instead, the Court wishes to take us back to a world where the political
question doctrine had bite. This was a world where the Court could not be sure of
its authority and whether its edict would be enforced. Alexander Bickel coined the
phrase "passive virtues" to signal the Court's need to sidestep questions as
needed. 3 The political question doctrine was one of various prudential tools that
provided the justices much needed flexibility.'54 To the Court, the existence of
judicially manageable standards was one of the factors that formed the political
question doctrine.15 5 For Bickel, however, the factors took on a decidedly different
gloss:
149 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 441-42 (2006);
see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. LJ. 1185, 1210
(2007) ("LULAC is best understood as a case that uses race to limit politics.").
'so Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), with Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305-06.
1 See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for
Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION LJ. 2 (2007); Nicholas 0.
Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Effciency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 831 (2015).
152 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,226 (1962).
153 See Bickel, supra note 4, at 42.
154 Id. at 45-46.
155 The factors according to the Court in Baker are as follows:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department, or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind dearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government, or an unusual
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[T]he court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of the
strangeness of the issue and the suspicion that it will have to yield more often and
more substantially to expediency than to principle; the sheer momentousness of it,
which unbalances judgment and prevents one from subsuming the normal
calculations of probabilities; the anxiety not so much that the judicial judgment
will be ignored, as that perhaps it should be, but won't; finally and in sum ("in a
mature democracy"), the inner vulnerability of an institution which is electorally
irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from. 15 6
These are unlike the factors catalogued by the Court in Baker. In fact, to read
Bickel's factors today is to think about a Court we would not recognize. Bickel's
conception is of a Court driven by anxiety and self-doubt. As the modern Court
stands ready to bring to an end to the Second Reconstruction, can anyone seriously
believe that anxiety and self-doubt form part of the Court's self-identity any
longer?
Thus the question: how to explain the Court's posture in the political
gerrymandering context as compared with the constitutional law world writ large?
The Court professes a lack of judicially manageable standards, but that is almost
dishonest. This search for standards offers a faqade of decorum, of a search for law.
It even sounds legal, doctrinal, right. But political questions have never been about
that. What the quest for standards does for the Court is mask larger questions
about the Court and its agenda. More importantly, the debate is carried out on the
terms set by the Court. In so doing, the conservative justices turn an institutional
question into a legal question. They then look for answers that they know will
never be found. This is dishonest.
And so we get to the bottom of the puzzle. What is the worry that drives the
justices, on prudential grounds, to remove the Court from considering political
gerrymandering questions? One obvious answer is that the justices are worried
about "a flood of litigation."157 This is Justice Kennedy's worry. He began his
concurring opinion in Vieth as follows:
A decision ordering the correction of all election district lines drawn for partisan
reasons would commit federal and state courts to unprecedented intervention in
the American political process. The Court is correct to refrain from directing this
substantial intrusion into the Nation's political life.A
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
116 Bickel, supra note 4, at 75.
157 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 326 n.14 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Justice Kennedy was likely alarmed, and I take him at his word. Unlike Justice
Scalia, who was alarmed yet ready to remove the Court from this area, 5 9 Justice
Kennedy was alarmed, yet willing to think the question further.1 6' But Justice
Kennedy was also wrong on the facts. His history was flawed. Even the extreme
way he states his point-an order from the Court requiring the correction of all
district lines-would not be an unprecedented intervention by the Court. This was
Baker. 6' This was Reynolds.6 2 This was Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly
of Colorado.'63
Consider in this vein Justice Stewart's critique. Justice Stewart cast one of the
deciding votes in Baker because he was willing to allow the Court to intervene in
redistricting but only under extreme circumstances."6 In subsequent cases, he
expressed his dismay at the Court's newfound boldness, which enforced an
equipopulation standard with uncharacteristic-even irrational-rigidity. He wrote
in Lucas "The Court's draconian pronouncement, which makes unconstitutional
the legislatures of most of the 50 States, finds no support in the words of the
Constitution, in any prior decision of this Court, or in the 175-year political history
of our Federal Union." 165 Stewart's critique makes dear that whatever judicial
intervention in political gerrymandering questions might be, it would not be
unprecedented.
This is not a new debate. This is a return to the old debate between Justice
Frankfurter and the Court. Justice Frankfurter famously argued that the Court
"ought not enter this political thicket."1 66 The criticism then, as now, is that judicial
intervention would embroil the courts in questions of politics. The obvious answer
is that this was the very ground upon which Baker was fought, and Justice
Frankfurter lost this battle long ago. More crucially, the Court's prestige and
respect grew as a result of this intervention. 67
For the future, the question is not whether scholars and commentators can
divine standards that will persuade the Court. The only question is, what will it
take to assuage Justice Kennedy's alarms about what he takes to be a "substantial
'5' This is a charitable reading of his position, at best.
160 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16' Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 226-29 (1962).
162 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,562-64 (1964).
163 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 734-36, 739 (1964).
164 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 265-66 (Stewart, J., concurring).
165 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
166 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).167 Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARV. L. REV.
986, 991 (1967) ("At least some of us who shook our heads over Baker v. Carr are prepared to admit
that it has not been futile, that it has not impaired, indeed that is has enhanced, the prestige of the
Court."); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore and the Making of a Precedent, in THE
UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, at 159, 194 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001) (explaining that "because
one-person, one-vote has been ... a stunning popular and jurisprudential success" the Court has based
subsequent activist decisions on similar grounds).
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intrusion" into politics? He is obviously concerned with the extreme ways to which
politicians go to rig district lines in their favor. This is the clear lesson of LULAC
How toxic must our political environment become for Justice Kennedy to finally
bring the Court to a place where it has long been?
CONCLUSION
The political gerrymander has few friends in the world. And yet, the Supreme
Court appears ready to remove itself from considering the constitutionality of this
hated political practice. This is an odd position to take in a world where the Court
decides most questions of public policy. This is not a timid Court, worried about its
stature in the world and how its opinions might be received by the relevant publics.
But in the political gerrymandering context, conservatives on the Court profess a
lack of judicially manageable standards as a reason for declaring these questions
nonjusticiable. This is one of the most interesting puzzles in modern constitutional
law. What explains this apparent incongruity?
This Essay argues that the Court's initial foray into the field of politics, in
Baker v. Car, leads inexorably to the political gerrymandering cases. To be sure,
the worry for the justices, and particularly Justice Kennedy, is that the Court will
embroil itself in political contests. The worry is akin to calls for too much justice.
But this is not a new worry. It dates back to the moment when the Court first
entered this field, in Baker, and particularly its implementation of the
equipopulation standard, in Reynolds v. Sims. Critics of judicial intervention
already fought this battle and lost. Rather than standards, then, what Justice
Kennedy really needs is a dose of history.
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